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I. INTRODUCTION
That courts apply the law is tritely true. To say what that involves,
though, is not easy. My goal in this paper is to give a jurisprudential
account of the notion; to clarify what applying the law is.
Three sets of questions present themselves at once. One concerns
what I will call the direct object of law-application. When a court
applies the law, what exactly is it applying? This is not a trick
question. Courts are said to ‘apply’ all sorts of things: statutes, rules,
principles, policies, doctrines, other courts’ views, and more. Is ‘the
law’ the name of another item on this list? That sounds wrong. Or is
it by applying some or any of those items that courts apply the law?
And if it is, can we give a principled criterion for determining what
the list contains?
A second set of questions regards the indirect object of law-appli-
cation. Courts do not just apply the law; they apply it to something.
To what, exactly? To cases? To facts? To the ‘facts of the particular
case’ before them, as the common phrase goes? We also say that a
court applies the law in a certain case; and in deciding a certain case.
Are all these the same? And what precisely is it to apply the law to a
case? Indeed – what is a ‘case’?
Third, there are questions about the content of law-application. Is
‘applying the law’ the name of a specific type of act? If so, what are
its distinctive features? If not – what then? There are also things
courts are said to do – decisions they are said to issue – by applying
the law. Are these themselves acts of law-application?
There is no obvious order in which to address these issues. Any
attempt to deal with the questions in one set would benefit from our
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having first tackled those in the others. Still, we need a strategy, and
mine will be to leave the first set of questions for last. I will not
explicitly discuss the direct object of law-application before the very
end of the paper; and until then, for convenience, I will focus on the
application of statutory and other written legal provisions – indis-
putable instances of law-application.
I cannot, however, begin by simply turning head-on to any of the
other two sets of questions. That is because there are – or so I want
to suggest – two kinds of law-application, each giving rise to its own
issues of content and indirect object. So I must start by explaining
what the two kinds are. I call them inferential law-application and
pragmatic law-application. I discuss the former in Section II, the latter
in Section III, and the relation between them in Section IV. In Sec-
tion V, I look into the notion of a ‘case’; and I return in Section VI to
our three opening sets of questions.
II. INFERENTIAL LAW-APPLICATION
A. A working example
Consider this excerpt from Lord Denning’s leading judgment in The
Hollandia:1
Article III, paragraph 8 [of the Hague-Visby Rules for the international carriage of goods by sea,
an international Convention given ‘the force of law’ by a UK Act of 1971] . . . is of the first
importance in our present case. It says that: ‘Any clause . . . lessening such liability [i.e. the
liability of a carrier for loss or damage to goods] otherwise than as provided in these Rules, shall
be null and void and of no effect’.
Now apply that article III, paragraph 8, to clause 2 of this bill of lading [issued by the defendants].
In so far as clause 2 restricts the liability of the carrier to D.fl. 1,250 it is clearly null and void:
because it lessens the liability of the carrier to much less than his liability under article IV,
paragraph 5(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules which comes to £11,490.96.
. . .
My conclusion is that, in proceedings in the courts of the United Kingdom clause 2 of this bill of
lading is null and void.
It is, I take it, uncontroversial that Denning applied Article III,
paragraph 8, of the Hague-Visby Rules to clause 2 of the bill of lading
before him. We would say so even if Denning had not explicitly used
that language. So I will take this as a working example. It gives us a
clear illustration of one sense in which we speak and think of law-
application.
1 The Hollandia [1982] Q.B. 872 (at 884A-B).
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So what does it involve?
B. A mental act
One thing it does not involve is the giving of an argument of any
sort. Denning is, of course, offering in that passage an argument for a
certain conclusion. His conclusion is that clause 2 in the bill of lading
before him is null and void as a matter of law. But giving that
argument is not part of his applying Article III, paragraph 8, of the
Rules to the relevant clause.
Denning’s applying the provision is a purely mental act. It is the
act of reasoning towards that conclusion – that the clause is null and
void – on the grounds of some link that he takes to hold between the
provision and the clause in question. This does not mean that
Denning’s belief in that conclusion must have been the product of
his mental engagement with the relevant provision. He could have
justifiably formed such a belief on grounds unconnected to Article
III, paragraph 8, of the Hague-Visby Rules. But it does mean that
Denning must have held the further belief that the provision and the
clause were related in such a way that, given that relation, his
conclusion could not be false.
So when Denning goes on to publicly give, in writing, an argu-
ment for his conclusion – when he goes on to justify that conclusion
to his readers – he has already applied the provision. What he writes
documents his line of reasoning. It is evidence, for us, of how he
thought. But he would still have applied Article III to the relevant
clause (whether or not we had been able to know it) had he failed, or
refused, for whatever reason, to put forward any argument at all.
Applying a provision to some object x – in this sense in which we
would say of Denning that he applied Article III to the clause in the
bill of lading – is something we can do purely by thinking. It is
reasoning towards a certain conclusion about x.
C. Application and applicability
If Denning’s applying that provision was for him to reason towards
the conclusion that the clause was null and void, then, I just claimed,
he must have taken these two items – provision and clause – to be
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linked in a certain way. In what way? What is the role in that
reasoning of the provision being applied?
The answer is, I think, that applying a provision p to some object
x is to reason towards a certain conclusion c about x on the grounds
that (a) p applies to x, and (b) if p applies to x, then c holds as a matter
of law. Denning does not explicitly use the language of applicability,
but it would not have been surprising if he had. His conclusion must
have been premised on Article III, paragraph 8’s applying to the
particular clause before him.
Is it licit for me to explain what it is for a person to apply a
provision p to a certain object x by saying that p must be taken by
that person to apply to x? There is no circularity. Applying a provision
to x is not the same as a provision’s applying to x. To say that Denning
applied Article III, paragraph 8, to the clause is to say something
about what Denning did. To say that Article III, paragraph 8, applied
to that clause is to say something about how the provision related to
the clause: it is to say that the provision is (or was) applicable to it.
But we need, of course, to be clearer about this notion.
Here is my take on the issue. First, to say that a provision p
applies to an object x is to say that there is some specific conse-
quence (or consequences) that the very existence of p has for x as a
matter of law. It is, therefore, to say that there is some claim about x
that is true as a matter of law, and that could not, given p, be false.
But one can know that a provision p applies to an object x and not
know exactly what the consequence is that p has for x as a matter of
law. One can know, that is, that there is some claim about x that
must, given p, be true as a matter of law; and yet not know exactly
what that claim is. And the reverse is possible as well. One can know
that if p applies to x, then a certain claim c about x will be true; but
not know whether p does apply to c.
To apply p to x is to work both these matters out. It is to form
one’s reasoned view about a certain consequence (or consequences)
that p does have for x as a matter of law.
What Denning’s applying Article III, paragraph 8, of the Hague-
Visby rules to clause 2 in the bill of lading before him comes down to
is his working out that that provision had the consequence of making
the clause null and void as a matter of law.
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D. Applicability claims
I said that applying a provision to a certain object x and thereby
reaching a certain conclusion about x does not have to go hand in
hand with actually giving an argument for that conclusion. But we
can learn something about law-application by considering how such
an argument, when given, is best reconstructed.
How should we think of the structure of Denning’s argument, the
argument he gives in the above-quoted passage? It might be
tempting to reconstruct it along the following lines:
(1) For every x, if x is a clause in a contract of carriage lessening
the carrier’s liability for damage to goods otherwise than as
provided in the Hague-Visby Rules, then x is null and void.
(2) Clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants is a
clause in a contract of carriage lessening the carrier’s liability for
damage to goods otherwise than as provided in the Hague-
Visby Rules.
Therefore (from (1) and (2)),
(3) Clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants is null
and void.
This is an instance of what is commonly called a ‘legal syllogism’: a
deductively valid argument that combines, as premises, (a) a general
first-order statement of law (the ‘major premise’, as it is normally – if
inaccurately – called), and (b) a statement about some aspect of the
case in hand that instantiates the antecedent of that general
statement of law (the ‘minor premise’); and whose conclusion,
taken to be true as a matter of law, is a statement about that same
aspect of the particular case.
The model of the legal syllogism – widely endorsed among legal
theorists – is meant to capture the justificatory structure of law-
applying decisions like Denning’s. It goes together with the view that
applying the law is (to quote but a recent formulation) ‘to solve a
legal dispute by subsuming an individual case under a general nor-
mative premise (a legal rule, legal standard, legal principle, legal
precedent, etc.)’.2 As I have argued elsewhere, however, the model
of the legal syllogism is incapable of achieving its own goals, and
2 See José Juan Moreso and Samuele Chilovi, ‘Interpretive Arguments and the Application of the
Law’ in G. Bongiovanni et al (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation (Springer 2018) 495.
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should be rejected.3 On the theory behind the model, a claim like (1)
is supposed to give a statement of the ‘rule’ expressed by the pro-
vision that Denning was applying. But there is no reason to attribute
to Denning a commitment to the truth of anything like the claim in
(1) above. Denning does not say, and has no need to say, and would
in all likelihood not want to say, that all liability-restricting clauses in
contracts of carriage other than as provided in the Hague-Visby rules
are null and void: all of them, regardless of context or surrounding
circumstances, with no room for qualifications or riders of any kind.
Nor does he say that the consequence of applying that provision
must always be, or only be, the nullity of some particular liability-
restricting clause in some contract of carriage.
The point, note, is not that the language in (1) sticks too closely to
the language of the provision itself, whereas a suitably qualified
universal would almost certainly have to depart from that text. (A
‘suitably qualified universal’ is one that – if it could be given at all,
which is itself unlikely – might plausibly stand as a true statement of
law.) The point, rather, is that Denning does simply not engage with
any universal statement of that sort, however qualified.
And the same is true of judges everywhere. When addressing
whether a provision applies to the case in hand, courts do not – and
would probably not even be able to – provide watertight descriptions
of the properties that would have to be satisfied by any case to which
the provision applies. They cannot even be reasonably expected to
offer watertight descriptions of the relevant properties of the case at
hand. They do not, as Denning does not, articulate and commit
themselves to statements of first-order ‘rules’ that they take the
relevant provision to express, and under which they then simply
subsume the case in hand.
And yet it is that provision that Denning is applying. It is by
reference to it that he argues for the conclusion that the clause in the
bill of lading was null and void; that the provision applies to the clause is
what supports his conclusion. How then should we go about
reconstructing arguments like these – like Denning’s?
3 For detailed discussion, and further references, see Luís Duarte d’Almeida, ‘On the Legal Syllo-
gism’, in David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro and Kevin Toh (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on
Metaethics and Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 2019) 335–364.
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One could think of different alternatives.4 Here is what I suggest:
(1¢) If Article III, paragraph 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules applies
to clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants, then
clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants is null and
void.
(2¢) Article III, paragraph 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules applies to
clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants.
Therefore (from (1¢) and (2¢)),
(3¢) Clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants is null
and void.
There are two points to highlight here. The first is that premise (2¢) is
– as is, therefore, the antecedent of the conditional in (1¢) – a second-
order claim about the applicability of a certain provision to a certain
object x. It is what I propose to call an applicability claim. I say it is a
second-order claim because – unlike the ‘major premise’ in the legal
syllogism, which purports to be a first-order statement of a ‘rule’
putatively expressed by the provision that is being applied – premise
(2¢) is a statement about the provision itself and how it relates to a
certain object.
Second, the argument in my proposed reconstruction is wholly
about the relation between the provision and a particular object. It is
not an argument about clauses (plural) in bills of lading (in general);
nor is it about the range of effects that Article III, paragraph 8, of the
Rules would possibly have on any such clause. It is an argument
about a certain clause – clause 2 in the specific bill of lading that
Denning had before him – and about the provision’s effect on it.
Whether or not Article III, paragraph 8, of the Rules would also have
the same effect, or a different effect, or no effect at all, on other
foreign law clauses in other bills of lading, or on any other object,
under different circumstances – that is beside the point, and was not
a part of either Denning’s argument or his reasoning towards the
relevant conclusion.
Nor should the justification of the applicability claim itself – the
justification of premise (2¢) – be taken to involve anything analogous
4 Including wondering whether such arguments might perhaps be characterised as non-deductive.
Here, however, I assume that the justification of law-applying decisions can indeed be understood as a
deductive inference: that too the received view; but on this specific point the received view is, I think,
well supported. (This is not to say that all legal arguments are best characterised as deductive.) For
references see, again, Luís Duarte d’Almeida ‘On the Legal Syllogism’, supra n 3.
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to the legal syllogism; to involve, that is, the articulation of a general
rule about the provision’s very applicability and whose antecedent is
instantiated by the clause in the bill of lading. We should not, in
other words, be looking to reconstruct Denning’s argument for his
applicability claim along the following lines:
(i) For every x, if x is a clause in a contract of carriage and x
lessens the carrier’s liability for damage to goods otherwise than
as provided in the Hague-Visby Rules, then Article III, para-
graph 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules applies to x.
(ii) Clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants is a
clause in a contract of carriage and lessens the carrier’s liability
for damage to goods otherwise than as provided in the Hague-
Visby Rules.
Therefore (from (i) and (ii)),
(2¢) Article III, paragraph 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules applies to
clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants.
How then are the relevant premises – both the applicability claim,
and premise (1¢), which specifies the consequence the provision is
taken to have for a certain object if it does apply to it – justified in the
context of arguments like Denning’s? On the basis of reasons of
different kinds, and of how such reasons bear on the particular object
to which the provision’s applicability is being discussed. That the
exact language of Article III, paragraph 8, of the Hague-Visby Rules
can be straightforwardly used to describe the clause in the bill of
lading – to say that that clause did ‘lessen’ the ‘liability of a carrier’
for loss or damage ‘otherwise than as provided in the Rules’ – is, of
course, one such reason; and a strong reason at that. But fit, however
clear, with the authoritative language of a provision is neither nec-
essary nor sufficient to justify a claim that the provision does apply to
some relevant object – as judicial practice shows beyond doubt. The
same holds for premise (1¢). Here too we can describe the conse-
quence that Denning takes the provision to have – that clause 2 is
null and void – in language found in the text of the provision itself.
But legal provisions can have consequences that their texts do not
mention and may even sometimes contradict. It all depends on what
reasons happen to bear on the case in hand – and correspondence
with the text is but one of those reasons. Just think of the diverse
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range of considerations normally called the ‘canons’ of statutory
interpretation. These are nothing more and nothing less than
pointers to kinds of reasons that can support, in arguments like
Denning’s, the justification both of applicability claims and of claims
about the consequences a provision has for a certain object.
Law-application is, in a sense, a particularistic affair. What I mean
is not that, for any conclusion correctly reached on the grounds that
some provision applies to some object x, there is no true universal
principle that captures all and only those aspects of x that are rele-
vant for that conclusion – a principle that could be used to construct
an inference that would fit a scheme identical to that of the legal
syllogism. What I mean is that we – and courts in particular – do not
(indeed, could not even be expected to be able to) engage mentally
with such principles as a necessary, typical, or even minimally fre-
quent step in either our reasoning or our arguments towards such
conclusions.
E. Any object? Any conclusion?
I have been speaking of the application of provisions to ‘some object
x’, and of law-application – in the sense discussed so far – as rea-
soning towards a conclusion ‘about x’ that is taken to be true as a
matter of law. But are there not restrictions on the range of objects
to which a provision can be applied? And should we not say instead,
perhaps, that applying the law must be reasoning towards a state-
ment of law, or at any rate a statement of the law ‘as applied’ to
something?
I think not. ‘Statement of law’ is an equivocal phrase. It is
sometimes used to refer to so-called ‘normative’ or ‘deontic’ state-
ments: statements about the normative positions (duties, liberties,
powers, and so on) we have under existing law. Courts do often
reason towards statements of that kind – statements, for example,
like ‘The defendant was under a duty to provide services to the
plaintiff’ – by applying existing law. But the range of conclusions that
can be reached and justified in that way is not confined to statements
of normative positions (Denning’s conclusion in The Hollandia, that
clause 2 in that particular bill of lading was ‘null and void’, is itself
not – at least not obviously – a deontic statement), and there is
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therefore no principled restriction on the range of objects to which
existing law can (conceptually) potentially be applied.
What does have to be the case is that the conclusion, whatever it
is, is taken to be true as a matter of law. This is a notion I cannot fully
analyse here. But a simple example will bring out one relevant point:
that a statement about some particular object can be put forward
either as true as a matter of law, or as true sans phrase. Consider the
following pair of provisions, subsections 54(1) and (2) of the Race
Relations Act 1976:
54. – (1) A complaint by any person (‘the complainant’) that another person (‘the respondent’) –
(a) has committed an act of discrimination against the complainant which is unlawful by
virtue of Part II; or
(b) is by virtue of section 32 or 33 to be treated as having committed such an act of
discrimination against the complainant,
may be presented to an industrial tribunal.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a complaint under section 12(1) of an act in respect of which
an appeal, or proceedings in the nature of an appeal, may be brought under any enactment, or to
a complaint to which section 75(8) applies.
In Khan v. General Medical Council,5 a doctor of Asian origin was
appealing a decision of an industrial tribunal. The General Medical
Council had denied him full registration as a Medical Practitioner;
and after unsuccessfully appealing to a Review Board, he complained
of indirect racial discrimination to the industrial tribunal, under
section 54(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976. The industrial tribunal,
applying section 54(2), dismissed the application; and the Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunal held in Khan that that had been the correct
decision.
The conclusion warranted by the industrial tribunal’s application
of section 54(2) to the applicant’s complaint was that section 54(1)
does not apply to that complaint. So here is how that tribunal’s
argument for that conclusion could be reconstructed:
(1) If section 54(2) of the Race Relations Act 1976 applies to the
applicant’s complaint, then section 54(1) of the Race Relations
Act 1976 does not apply to the applicant’s complaint.
(2) Section 54(2) of the Race Relations Act 1976 applies to the
applicant’s complaint.
Therefore (from (1) and (2)),
5 Khan v. General Medical Council (17 BLMR 1-10 [1993]).
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(3) Section 54(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976 does not apply
to the applicant’s complaint.
Here, both premise (2) and the conclusion are statements of the
same kind. Both are applicability statements: one positive, the other
negative. But in the context of this argument, there is a crucial
difference between the two. The conclusion is being put forth as a
claim taken to be true as a matter of existing law. It is justified, as
was the conclusion in Denning’s argument, on the grounds that
there is a certain provision that is part of existing law – section 54(2)
– that applies to, and carries a certain consequence for, the appli-
cant’s complaint.
Premise (2) is also being put forth as true, of course; it is part of
the same argument. But it is not (or at any rate not necessarily) being
put forth as true as a matter of law. Perhaps it is being put forth – as
was the similar premise in Denning’s argument – on the basis of
whatever substantive reasons bear on the applicability of sec-
tion 54(2) to the applicant’s complaint.
A claim about some object x is put forth as true as a matter of law
if it is put forth on the grounds that there is some section of existing
law that applies to x, and whose applicability to x is taken to suffice
for that claim to be true. But any such claim about some object x will
ultimately be premised on an applicability claim that is itself put
forth as true but not as a matter of law: an applicability claim such
that there is no section of existing law that suffices to make it true.
F. Definition
Our discussion brought out four main aspects of law-application in
the sense we have been discussing – a sense I propose to refer to as
inferential law-application. First, to inferentially apply the law is to
reason in a certain way. Second, it is to reason towards a conclusion
about some object x – any object. Third, it is reasoning towards that
conclusion on the grounds that a certain provision p applies, with a
certain consequence, to x. And fourth, the conclusion is taken to be
true as a matter of law.
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Here then is a definition:
Inferential law-application (for written provisions): To inferen-
tially apply a provision p (on its own) to some object x is to
reason towards a conclusion c about x on the grounds that (a) p
applies to x, and (b) if p applies to x, then c is true as a matter of
law.6
This definition is meant to capture one sense in which we –
lawyers and judges, but citizens too – commonly think and speak of
law-application. But as I said, inferential law-application is only one




As you can imagine, inferentially applying the law was not all
Denning did in The Hollandia. In fact, had Denning limited himself to
reasoning and arguing towards the conclusion that the clause in the
bill of lading was null and void – had that been all he had done – he
would have been rightly accused of having failed to apply the law to
the case before him.
What else did he have to do? He had to, and did, allow the appeal:
My conclusion is that, in proceedings in the courts of the United Kingdom clause 2 of this bill of
lading is null and void. This action should not be stayed. It should proceed – with the limit of
liability being that prescribed by the Hague-Visby Rules.
. . .
I would allow the appeal, remove the stay imposed by the judge, and allow the action to
proceed in England.7
So there is a sense of ‘applying the law’ that refers, not to any mental
act of reasoning towards some conclusion, but to the actual
performance of an external, non-mental action with certain charac-
teristics. This is what I propose to call pragmatic law-application, and
6 Both this definition and that of pragmatic law-application (shortly to be offered in Section III.A) are
meant as analyses of the notions being defined. The discussion so far has sought to identify features that
we, as competent users of those two concepts (though not, of course, under the names coined here for
each), do take – and can now, upon reflection, recognise – the two kinds of law-application to have. The
following section does the same for pragmatic law-application. The proposed definitions aim to crys-
tallise such features in a perspicuous formulation.
7 The Hollandia [1982] Q.B. 872 at 884G-885A.
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here is how I think it can be defined:
Pragmatic law-application (for written provisions): To pragmati-
cally apply a provision p is to perform an action u such that:
(a) the agent takes u to be an action that either (a1) she legally
ought to perform, or at least (a2) she is legally permitted to
perform (in the sense that it is not the case that she legally
ought not to perform it);
(b) the agent takes the relevant ought-claim – that is, (a1) or (a2)
– to be supported by the conclusion of the inferential applica-
tion of p to some object x; and
(c) by u-ing, the agent purports to be authoritatively settling
some particular question or matter.
As the definition makes clear, pragmatic and inferential law-
application are closely related. I will say more about this relation
in Section IV. First, though, there are some aspects of the definition
that I want to discuss.
B. Judicial action and judicial decision
The definition mentions the performance by an agent of a certain
action. This could be understood in a wide sense, to include omis-
sions. But in the case of courts, it is the performance of actions in the
strict sense, not omissions, that is invariably at stake. That is because
doing nothing is seldom, if ever, a live option for a judge. Denning’s
option was not to either allow the appeal or simply do nothing. It
was to either allow or refuse to allow it – by actually issuing a
decision to that effect.
‘Decision’, indeed, is how the relevant action is normally referred
to in legal discourse. The court in The Hollandia, we would say,
decided to allow the appeal. This does not normally mean much more
than ‘the court allowed the appeal’. But it conveys the thought that
the court was concerned, as courts typically are, with a driving
normative question: ought it to allow the appeal? At stake in prag-
matic law-application is the legal justification of such decisions. A
court’s decision d is legally justified in one of two scenarios: (a) if d is
the decision that the court legally ought to issue in the relevant
decision-making context; or, if there is no single decision the court
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legally ought to issue in that context, (b) if d is not a decision the
court legally ought not to issue – if, that is, the court is legally
permitted (in one sense of the word) to issue it.
Not all legally justified judicial decisions are law-applying deci-
sions. But what courts legally ought to do turns in part – in large part
– on existing law. If a court in deciding in a certain way does cor-
rectly apply the law, that suffices for its decision to be legally justi-
fied.
This is what we see in The Hollandia. Denning manifestly took the
view that allowing the appeal was the action the court legally ought
to perform; and he took this view on the basis that there was a
certain provision – Article III, paragraph 8, of the Hague-Visby Rules
– which applied, with a certain consequence, to the particular clause
in the bill of lading. So he took the court’s decision to be legally
justified by reference to that provision; he took the provision to
normatively support – to provide, as it were, normative warrant to –
the court’s action of allowing the appeal.
We can say, then, that to pragmatically apply a provision is to
perform an action – to issue a decision – that one takes to be legally
justified by reference to the provision. But ‘by reference to the
provision’ is still an opaque description: the justificatory link itself,
the link between provision and action, is what now needs to be
clarified.
C. Justifying law-applying decisions
One way to think about it is again to consider the structure of the
argument that a judge like Denning would give to justify such a
decision, to argumentatively show the decision to be legally justified
qua law-applying decision. It is not part of my proposed definition
that whoever pragmatically applies a provision must also give an
argument showing the corresponding action to be legally justified. A
court could simply act in the way described in the definition, and it
would be applying the law – even if it were impossible to tell,
externally, that the action had been performed as an action of law-
application. But again, courts do commonly give arguments to that
effect, and we can learn something about pragmatic law-application
by reflecting on the structure of such arguments; for the justificatory
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link between the provision being applied and the action being per-
formed will be made apparent in the fully reconstructed inference.
How should we reconstruct Denning’s argument? My suggestion:
(1) If Article III, paragraph 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules applies to
clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants, then
clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants is null and
void.
(2) Article III, paragraph 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules applies to
clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants.
Therefore (from (1) and (2)),
(3) Clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants is null
and void.
(4) If clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants is null
and void, and there are no countervailing considerations, then
we [i.e. the court] legally ought to allow the appeal and remove
the stay on the plaintiff’s action.
(5) There are no countervailing considerations.
Therefore (from (3)-(5)),
(6) We legally ought to allow the appeal and remove the stay on
the plaintiff’s action.
This is a complex deductive argument, in two steps. The first step
– from (1) and (2) to (3) – is the argument that corresponds, as we
saw in Section II, to the inferential application of the provision to the
clause in the bill of lading. Premise (2) is the relevant applicability
claim; the conclusion, a statement of the effect that the provision is
taken to have on the clause. But it is the second step – from (3), (4),
and (5) to (6) – that primarily concerns us now.
Premise (4) is the crucial one. What it purports to capture is that
what is asserted in premise (3) – which describes the outcome of the
inferential application of the provision to the clause – is taken by the
court to be a reason for adopting a certain course of action. Premise
(4) identifies the action – allowing the appeal – that counts, in the
particular decision-making context, as the action of applying the
provision; and signals, with the ‘there are no countervailing con-
siderations’ rider, that the fact that the clause in the bill of lading is
null and void supports normatively, although it does not conclu-
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sively establish, the conclusion that the court legally ought to allow
the appeal.
Logically speaking, of course, the inference could be compressed.
If a court is disposed to endorse premises (1) and (4) in the inference
above, then it could instead directly put forward the following
conditional, which those two claims entail (by hypothetical syllo-
gism):
(1¢) If Article III, paragraph 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules applies
to clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants, and
there are no countervailing considerations, then we legally
ought to allow the appeal and remove the stay on the plaintiff’s
action.
Together with (2) and (5), this claim entails the final conclusion. So
the court could simply have offered the following one-step inference,
rather than the more complex one I gave above:
(1¢) If Article III, paragraph 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules applies
to clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants, and
there are no countervailing considerations, then we legally
ought to allow the appeal and remove the stay on the plaintiff’s
action.
(2) Article III, paragraph 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules applies to
clause 2 of the bill of lading issued by the defendants.
(5) There are no countervailing considerations.
Therefore (from (1¢), (2), and (5)),
(6) We legally ought to allow the appeal and remove the stay on
the plaintiff’s action.
This would do, argumentatively, but only if neither (1) nor (4) in the
more complex version of the argument happened to be controversial
in the particular decision-making context. The court would, in any
event, have to be prepared to both unpack and defend the move
from the applicability claim – premise (2) – to the ought-claim in the
conclusion; and the way to do it would be by specifying the
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substantive claim that is the conclusion of the inferential application
of the provision to the clause.8
D. Support
I said that in the complex argument above, premise (4) presents the fact
that the clause in the bill of lading is null and void as a reason supporting
the court’s decision to allow the appeal. Why merely as a reason rather
than as a fact sufficient to establish that allowing the appeal is what the
court legally ought to do? Was the court not legally bound to allow the
appeal if indeed the clause was null and void?
No. For one, the applicability of Article III, paragraph 8 of the
Hague-Visby Rules, with its effect of rendering the clause null and
void, is consistent with there being other sections of positive law that
might also bear on the matter – including other provisions applicable
to the same clause – and that could provide reasons against allowing
the appeal (or at least support the conclusion that it is not the case
that the court legally ought to allow it); there can be conflicting but
equally valid applicable provisions. And more generally, even in the
absence of any conflicting provision, it could be that the court was
legally permitted not to allow the appeal in the name of some legally
relevant countervailing reason. What a court legally ought to do is
never solely determined by the applicable positive law.
By a ‘reason’ I do not mean only a consideration that counts
either for or against deciding in a certain way. Consider provisions
like the following (from the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016):
35 Authorisation for questioning
(1) The court may authorise a constable to question a person about an offence after the person
has been officially accused of committing the offence.
. . .
8 In ‘Applicability and Effectiveness of Legal Norms’, Law and Philosophy 16 (1997) 201–219, at 203–
207, Pablo E. Navarro and José Juan Moreso distinguish between the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’
applicability of legal norms. The former notion is intended to capture what I called – in Section II, when
discussing inferential law-application – applicability tout court; it concerns a conceptual relation between
a legal norm and a certain individual case. (See also Pablo E. Navarro and Jorge L. Rodríguez, Deontic
Logic and Legal Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2014), 126–129.) ‘External’ applica-
bility, by contrast, is a normative notion: to say that a norm N is externally applicable to a certain
generic case C is, in their definition, to say that the application of N to the individual cases that are
instances of C is required (or at least permitted) by some other norm. But this is not sufficiently fine-
grained: their notion of external applicability – with its generic reference to the application of a norm, a
concept they do not explore – glosses over the distinction between inferential and pragmatic law-
application. It is the latter kind only, I think, that they have in mind.
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This provision, which confers a liberty, is one that a court that
decides to authorise such questioning may be pragmatically apply-
ing. The court may correctly take its decision to be one that it is
legally permitted to issue (and so one such that it is not the case that
the court ought legally not to issue it); and it will take the provision
to support (though, again, not conclusively) that ought-proposition.
But it does not follow, and does not have to be true, that the court
legally ought to authorise questioning. It could be true neither that it
ought, nor that it ought not, which would suffice for the decision to
be legally justified; and in any case, that provision does certainly not
provide the court with any reason for deciding either way. Not all
facts that support ought-propositions are reasons for or against
anything; and by a ‘reason’ what I mean is a fact that supports an
ought-proposition.9
Note, by the way, that the conclusion of the inferential law-
application of some provision may well be a claim directly about the
same action that the court is then justified in performing if it is to
pragmatically apply the provision. That is what we see in the
example just given. The provision that justifies (absent countervail-
ing considerations) the court’s decision to authorise a constable to
question someone is itself a provision about courts’ decisions to
authorise constables to question someone. (In The Hollandia, by
contrast, the provision being applied concerned liability-restricting
clauses in contracts of carriage, not whether certain appeals should
be denied.) But we should still differentiate in such cases between the
conclusion of the inferential application of that provision in some
particular situation (e.g. ‘This court has a liberty to authorise a
constable to question this person’), and the ought-claim that that
conclusion supports (‘It is not the case that this court legally ought
not to authorise a constable to question this person’.). The condi-
tional ‘If Section 35(1) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016
applies to the present situation, then it is not the case that this court
9 Euan MacDonald and I try to give an an account of reasons in terms of the ‘support’ relation –
which focuses on the relation between the facts that constitute reasons and the truth-value of ought-
claims (as opposed to the ‘favouring’ relation, which focuses on the relation between the facts that
constitute reasons and what they are reasons for – actions, beliefs, etc.) – in Luís Duarte d’Almeida and
Euan MacDonald, ‘Contra Tantum Reasons’ (unpublished typescript, on file with the author). For
present purposes, however, it suffices to say that my use of ‘reason’ includes both ‘favourers’ and
‘supporters’ – both reasons for and reasons against a certain course of action.
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ought not to authorise a constable to question this person’ is not a
tautology.
E. Acting in an authoritative capacity
What makes Denning’s action – his decision – an act of law-appli-
cation, though, is not simply the fact that he took it to be one that he
ought legally to perform. It would not be an act of law-application
had it not been performed – or, at least, had Denning not purported
to perform it – in a specific role (that of a judge, in his case) and as a
means of authoritatively putting an end (even if only a provisional
one) to a certain matter or controversy.
We can as citizens, some authors remark, engage with the law in
various ways – we can follow it, comply with it, break it, avail
ourselves of it, invoke it, and so on – but not quite by ‘applying’ it.10
This is only partly true, as we now know: for we do often as mere
citizens inferentially apply the law. Suppose you want to get married
but, having recently obtained a divorce, wonder whether you are
legally able to marry again so soon. So you read the relevant statutes
and conclude that you are indeed permitted to remarry. You have
applied – inferentially applied – the relevant provision or provisions
to come to that conclusion.
But it is true that by then going ahead and actually getting
married you will not be performing any further act of law-applica-
tion; you will merely be exercising a legal power and availing
yourself of the accompanying liberty.11 Likewise, I may by inferen-
tially applying some provision come to the conclusion that legally I
have a duty to pay you a certain amount of money; but by paying
you I am not ‘applying’ the law: I am merely discharging my duty.
It is not in our capacity as citizens that we pragmatically apply
legal provisions. We pragmatically apply a legal provision only
when, in some specific role or capacity – such as, paradigmatically,
that of a judge – we exercise (or at least purport to exercise) the
authority to bring some matter or controversy to a resolution of
10 See, e.g., Gerald C. MacCallum, ‘On Applying Rules’ in Legislative Intent and Other Essays on Law,
Politics, and Morality (edited by Marcus G. Singer and Rex Martin), The University of Wisconsin Press
(1993) 64–74, at 63, 72–74; Giorgio Pino, ‘L’applicabilità delle norme giuridiche’, Diritto e Questioni
Pubbliche 11 (2011) 797–871 at 802–809; Mathieu Carpentier, ‘Validity versus Applicability: A (Small)
Dose of Scepticism’, Diritto e Questione Pubbliche 18 (2018) 107–132 at 109–111.
11 Thanks to Antony Duff for discussion on this point.
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some kind. The relevant action – the decision – is meant to settle
such matter, and is taken by the agent to be justified by reference to
the provision.12
IV. HOW ARE INFERENTIAL AND PRAGMATIC LAW-APPLICATION
RELATED?
Pragmatic law-application conceptually presupposes – as my defini-
tion makes clear – inferential law-application. But there is more to
say about the relations between the two kinds.
First, the agent who pragmatically applies a provision p need not
be the same person who has inferentially applied it to whatever the
relevant object happens to be. Typically, of course, it will be the
same judge or court who will both inferentially apply a provision to
some object x, drawing the relevant conclusion; and then go on to
pragmatically apply that provision by performing the action that that
conclusion supports. But the two operations can fall upon different
entities. That is what appears to be the case, for example, when a
national court of a member state of the European Union refers an
interpretative question of EU Law to the Court of Justice of the
European Union. The Court of Justice’s ruling may well involve the
inferential application of EU Law – and will then be relied upon by
the national court as it proceeds to pragmatically apply the relevant
law.13
Second, neither pragmatic nor inferential law-application is
explanatorily reducible to the other. Why might someone think that,
given my definitions, pragmatic law-application is reducible to
inferential law-application? The thought would be that the pragmatic
application of a certain provision p could be understood in terms of
the inferential application of something else: of the putatively legal
rule that, if p applies with a certain consequence to a certain object,
then, absent countervailing considerations, the court legally ought to
12 This is not to say that we can never as mere citizens perform actions that might be called actions
of ‘law-application’ in some sense of the notion – a sense not reducible to notions such as that of
complying with the law, that of following the law, that of doing as the law requires, and so on. Consid-
erations like the ones just mentioned are not enough to settle that point. But it is not a point I aim to
settle in this paper. My focus is the particular and distinctive sense in which we say of courts (and other
institutional agents) that they characteristically by their actions apply the law. We think of courts as law-
applying bodies; and what we mean is not that courts simply happen to – as anyone else might too –
apply the law.
13 Thanks to Maggie O’Brien for discussion here, and to Euan MacDonald for the example.
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decide in a certain way (or at least it is not the case that legally it
ought not to decide in a certain way). The pragmatic application of p
would then be explainable as (a) the inferential application of this
rule, simply coupled with (b) the actual performance by the court of
the relevant action. In The Hollandia, for example, the court’s prag-
matic application of Article III, paragraph 8 of the Hague-Visby Rules
could be explained – so the thought would run – as the inferential
application of the rule that, if that provision applies to the clause of
the bill of lading with the consequence of making it null and void,
then, if there are no countervailing considerations, the court legally
ought to allow the appeal. Having reasoned towards this conclusion
– seemingly meeting my definition of inferential law-application –
the court simply acted accordingly. There is nothing left to account
for or explain.
But this line of reasoning is misguided. It is true that in prag-
matically applying a provision p, a court will have reasoned that if p
applies with a certain consequence to a certain object, then, absent
countervailing considerations, its decision is one that it legally ought
to issue (or not one it ought not legally to issue). But conditional
statements like this, if true, are not themselves true as a matter of
law. If they state a rule, it is not one that is part of existing law.
Rather, it would be a rule about existing law and how it bears on
what the court legally ought to do; a rule about what to do if some
part of existing law – provision p – applies to some given object.
Or to put things more generally: the rule (or principle, if that is
what it is) that courts ought to apply the law is not itself part of the
law that it directs courts to apply. This is not to say that there could
not be a legal rule – part of existing law – requiring courts to apply
existing law; a self-referential rule even. But we would still need to
know if courts legally ought to apply existing law, including that rule:
and if they ought, the rule or principle that so determined would
itself not be part of existing law. So pragmatic law-application cannot
be explained in terms of inferential law-application. (Not to mention,
of course, that inferential law-application is based, as I argued in
Section II.D, on second-order applicability claims, not first-order
claims stating the content of whatever it is that is being applied.)
Nor is inferential law-application reducible to pragmatic law-ap-
plication. Here, the thought would be that if inferential law-appli-
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cation comes down to, as I suggested, the performance of a mental
act, then it could be brought under my definition of pragmatic law-
application, given a suitably broad reading of ‘action’. But again, this
would not do. What pragmatic law-application comes down to is the
performance not just of an action, but of an action that the agent
takes to be legally justified on the basis of existing law; and that is
never true of the mental act of coming to some conclusion about
some object on the basis of existing law. Perhaps it is true that in The
Hollandia, Denning ought to have reached, as he did, the conclusion
that the clause in the bill of lading was null and void as a matter of
law. But the mental act of reaching this conclusion is itself not an act
that stands to be justified by reference to existing law. Rather, it
stands to be justified by reference to whatever substantive (and
logical) considerations govern how courts should rely on existing law
to reason towards conclusions about particular objects like clauses in
bills of lading.
Still, the two kinds of law-application are related not just con-
ceptually but also normatively. I mentioned in Section II.D that the
justification of applicability claims (and of claims about their con-
sequences) turns on a range of substantive considerations, to which a
court should be responsive. These include the further consequences
that will (or would) follow if the conclusion that is the outcome of
inferentially applying that provision is indeed taken to be true as a
matter of law, and acted upon. In other words, the fact that there
would be a certain decision d that a court ought to issue if the
relevant provision applies with a certain consequence to some object
x is itself a consideration to be taken into account when determining
whether or not the provision does apply to x. If d is in some way an
undesirable or unwelcome or absurd decision to issue in the par-
ticular decision-making context, then that is a consideration that
bears on the court’s reasoning about whether or not the relevant
provision applies. Pragmatic law-application, in short, normatively
feeds back into inferential law-application.
V. CASES
As I mentioned in Section I, courts are often said to apply the law
both to and in cases. So far I have tried to avoid the language of
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‘cases’, and succeeded almost always. But my proposed definitions
had better be at least compatible with it. Are they?
The notion of a case is less clear than it seems. We encounter in
legal discourse, I think, at least four senses of the word.
Sometimes – call this Sense 1 – what we mean by a case is just,
well, nothing at all. Consider the following claim:
(A) The provision in Article III, paragraph 8, of the Hague-Visby
rules applies to the case of a foreign law clause in a bill of lading.
This is something that the The Hollandia court could have said. But
what is this ‘case of a foreign law clause’? It is not what the court
would call ‘the case in hand’; that would make no sense. The claim
above is simply, it seems to me, a needless periphrasis.14 It is a
roundabout way of saying that
(B) The provision in Article III, paragraph 8, of the Hague-Visby
rules applies to foreign law clauses in bills of lading,
which is itself to be understood as the claim that the fact that a clause
is a foreign clause in a bill of lading does not mean that the provision
will not apply to it.
Likewise,
(C) The provision in Article III, paragraph 8, of the Hague-Visby
rules applies to the case of clause 2 in the bill of lading issued by
the defendants
means nothing more than
(D) The provision in Article III, paragraph 8, of the Hague-Visby
rules applies to clause 2 in the bill of lading issued by the
defendants.
In another sense of the word – the one in play when we speak of a
judge deciding the case before her – a case is really a particular ques-
14 Arthur Quiller-Couch has some amusing remarks on the word ‘case’ – ‘jargon’s dearest child’, he
calls it – in On the Art of Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1923) 77. Fowler was also not
a fan: ‘there is perhaps no single word so freely resorted to as a trouble-saver, and consequently
responsible for so much flabby writing’; see Fowler’s Modern English Usage, ed. Ernest Gowers (2nd
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1968) 76–77; and H.W. and F.G. Fowler, The King’s English
(third edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1931) 15–16. In case you are wondering, Fowler does not
object to ‘fan’. (He would also not have objected – in case you are also wondering – to ‘in case you are
wondering’: it is one of the ‘legitimate uses’ of the word. ‘In the case of ‘, though – that is ‘the worst
offender’.)
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tion. It is a question brought to a judge and on which she is expected
to rule. It is always a normative question, and it always concerns
some action by the judge or court. Should the judge enforce this
contract? Convict this defendant? Allow this appeal? To ‘decide the
case’ is for the court to adopt one particular course of action: the
course of action that corresponds to what the judge thinks she legally
ought to do when facing such a question.
But although a case in this sense of the word – Sense 2 – is a question
rather than a set of facts, it is often a question raised in connection with a
particular set of facts (or descriptions of facts) also brought before a
judge. These are what we would normally call the ‘facts of the case’; and
such facts – themselves not the ‘case’ in the sense just specified – are
what we sometimes also call ‘the case’ before the judge. So in this sense
– Sense 3 – of the term, a ‘case’ is a series of descriptions of particular
facts, in connection with which a certain normative question (a ‘case’ in
Sense 2) has been raised and brought before a judge to be decided.
In a fourth sense, the term refers more broadly to any decision-
making context in which a court is asked to rule on a case in the
second sense of the term. ‘In this case’, the court could have said in
The Hollandia, referring to the particular decision-making context in
which it found itself, ‘we decide to allow the appeal’.
(There is a fifth sense, although it is of no interest for our present
purposes; it is the sense in which we speak, for example, of The
Hollandia as itself a ‘case’: a ‘case’ we can refer to, quote from,
analyse, criticise, and so on. Here the term refers comprehensively to
a certain decision-making event with all its components, including
the actual decision issued by the court, together with its record in the
court’s written opinion.)
Do courts, then, apply the law to or in – or in deciding – cases in
any one of these senses? Yes. In Sense 1, the term is used to refer –
although redundantly – to the indirect object of inferential law-
application: to that to which the law is being inferentially applied. In
Sense 4, it refers to the decision-making context in which the court
faces a normative question to which the ought-claim of pragmatic
law-application provides an answer. And in Sense 2, it refers to this
very question, the question in the decision of which the court will be
pragmatically applying the law.
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VI. CONCLUSION
I started this paper by identifying three sets of questions about law-
application: questions about what I called (a) its direct object, (b) its
indirect object, and (c) its content. I left all three for the end, though for
different reasons.
I postponed dealing with questions of indirect object and content
because, I explained, these might receive different answers depend-
ing on the type of law-application we have in mind. What I have just
said, in Section V, about the notion of a case, shows that this is
indeed true of the indirect object of law-application. The indirect
object of inferential law-application is a ‘case’ only in that first,
empty sense of the word. It is, as we saw in Section II.E, any object x
such that the applicability of some part of existing law to x will bear
on whether a certain statement about x is true as a matter of law.
That is what a court will inferentially apply the law to. Pragmatic
law-application, by contrast, is application, not to but in a case, or in
deciding a case – but in other senses of ‘case’. As to the content of each
kind of law-application, that is precisely what my proposed defini-
tions purport to characterise.
Questions about the direct object of law application, though, I
postponed merely for reasons of convenience. Focusing on the
application of single written provisions allowed me to rely on clear
and simple examples as I developed and defended my analyses. But
what can we say more generally about the direct object of law-
application?
We can say that it encompasses any context-salient part of
existing law: any section of positive (or indeed non-positive,
depending on what your legal metaphysics allows) law as it exists at
the time of application, and which can be identified as such – as part
of existing law – independently of any views on its applicability and
application to any object (and independently also of any views on the
normative desirability of pragmatically applying it in any particular
decision-making context). It could be a provision, but also, for
example, a set of provisions taken together, or a precedent decision,
or a custom – or whatever it is that properly counts as part of law
under the correct theory of what law is.
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